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UNIVERSALISM AND AUTONOMY:
TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE DEFENSE
OF UNIVERSALISM
Eric H. Reitan

In arecent article, Michael Murray critiques several versions of universalism-that is, the doctrine that in the end all persons are saved. Gf particular
interest to Murray is Thomas Talbott's version of universalism (called SUI
by Murray), which puts forward a strategy for ensuring universal salvation
that purports to preserve the autonomy of the creatures saved. Murray
argues that, on the contrary, the approach put forward in SUI is not autonomy-preserving at all. I argue that this approach preserves the autonomy of
the creature at least as well as the approach posited by the traditional doctrine of hell. Since SU] clearly does more to preserve the well-being of the
creature, it follows that, on the assumption that God loves all His creatures,
SLTI is preferable to the doctrine of hell.

I ntroduction

In recent years, the traditional Christian doctrine of hell (DH)-that is, the
doctrine that some people endure eternal sufferin.g after death-has come
under critical philosophical scrutiny, with both philosophical critics and
defenders. 1 While the opponents of DH tend to embrace universalism2that is, the doctrine that in the end all people are saved by God and enjoy
etemal communion with Him-this alternative has not received the same
level of philosophical attention as has DH. Since universalism is without
question the most popular alternative to DH, any complete philosophical
investigation of the appropriate Christian stance towards the afterlife
would call for sustained critical scrutiny of both DH and universalism.
To this end, arecent article by Michael Murray is an important step
forward. In I/Three Versions of Universalism," Mllrray offers a kind of
n.egative support for DH by challenging the acceptability of universalisn1,
thereby turning philosophical attention towards this alternative. 3 In what
follows, I will argue that, even though Murray's critique is interesting
and important, it ultimately fails to undermine universalism, which
remains a viable alternative to DH. In fact, on the basis of the two primary challenges Murray levels-respect for autonomy and the oddity of the
earthly life-universalism actually fares better than DH. Hence, at least
from a purely philosophical standpoint, Llniversalism appears to be
preferable to DH.
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I: Murray' s Understanding of the Doctrine ofHell
Murray does not offer more than a sketchy account of DH in his essay, perhaps because his primary aim is to critique universalism. Nevertheless,
having a clear sense of what Murray means by "the doctrine of hell" will
be helpful in evaluating the import of Murray's essay for a comparative
analysis of the rival doctrines.
Murray indicates that the doctrine of hell involves the view that God will
"send some of His creatures, all of whom He loves, to an etemity of sufferin.g in separation from I-lim."4 Insofar as Murray affirms God's universal
love, he is not interested in considering what Talbott calls "hard-hearted
theism" (the view that God does not love some of His creatures, and these
He condemns to hell).5 This makes sense, given what strikes me as its obviously unchristian character. Murray's accoLmt remains ambiguous, however, for two main reasons. First, he fails to indicate whether the suffering to
which God commits some of His creatures is simply the suffering intrinsic
to existing in astate of alienation from God, or whether there is some additional suffering superadded to this. 6 Given the assumption that the suffering
in question is etemal, and hence cannot be reasonably interpreted as suffering imposed as part of remedial punishment, the former interpretation is
easier to reconcile with the universal love of God. But even if we adopt this
former interpretation, it remains unclear whether the condition of eternal
alienation is ilnposed by God, in. th.e sense that it results from an etenlal rejection of the sinner by God, or whether it is permitted by God, in the sense that
it results from an etemal rejection of God by the sinner. Put another way, it
is initially unclear whether Murray has in mind what Talbott refers to as
conservative theism or what he calls moderately conservative theism. 7
Murray's later discussion of universalism, however, reveals a commitment to a view of hell characterized by the following two important features: first, the eternal destiny of each person is fixed at the time of death, so
that after death they either enjoy eternal communion with God or eternal
alienation from Hirn (there is no third alternative, such as aperiod of alienation followed by conlmunion); second, what fixes the eternal destiny of
every person is their autonomous choice during their earthly life either to
accept communion with God or to reject it. 8 Given these two commitments,
the most plausible assumption is that Murray's view falls somewhere
between Talbott's conservative and moderately conservative theism. In
effect, Murray's view is that at the time of death, God decides to etemally
reject those who have, at that time, autonomously chosen to reject Hirn.
What is distinctive about this version of conservative theism is that, contra
Talbott, Murray thinks that God's decision to reject for all eternity tllose
who are unregenerate at death shows greater respect for the autonomy of
the unregenerate than does Talbott's version of universalism (outlined
below). Hence, tllere emerges a defense of the coherence of DH of the following sort: A perfectly loving God would, out of love for the unregenerate, respect their autonomous choice to reject God by confirming them in
that choice for all eternity. In Murray's view, thel1, God's "rejection" of
those who are unregenerate at death should be understood as God's decision to, in effect, leave them to the fruits of their own autonomous choice.
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Murray's view of DH, then, has the advantage of being formulated in
response to some of the more recent critical challenges leveled against it. It is
aversion of DH that makes etemal damnation into aI'l expression of respect for
the damned, and in these terms is taken to be compatible with a God who is
perfectly loving towards each of his creatures. Murray's most compelling
criticism of universalism is that it fails to respect the creature in the way that
DH does, because (he thinks) universalism inevitably undercuts the autonomy of those who, at the end of their earthly lives, have chosen to reject God.
If Marilyn Adams is right that there is a "Problem of Hell" analogous to the
traditional problem of evil, thel'l Murray's essay can be viewed as offering a
solution to the Problem of Hell analogous to the Free Will defel'lSe.

11: Murray in Outline
Like Talbott, who identifies three versions of DH and challenges all three,
Murray identifies three versions of universalism: the naIve version of universalism (NU)-essentially, the view that all those who do not freely
choose commul'lion with God are miraculously transformed by God at the
moment of death in such a way that they do will it-and two versions of
what he calls sophisticated Llniversalism (SUI and SU2). While he admits
that no one has endorsed NU, he discusses it in order to "set out some critical apparatus" that he will use in his critique of SUI and SU2. 9 Of these latter, SUI is the version that has been most fully and explicitly developed in
the literature, and it is towards this version that Murray therefore directs
his most sustained critique. My comments will therefore center on SUl.
SUl, in brief, is the view that God achieves universal salvation by permitting "those who have refused to turn to hirn by the time of their death
to continue to exist in other environments, environments in which God can
progressively strip away their false beliefs or hardness of heart."10 Murray
attributes this view to both Marilyn Adams and Thomas Talbott, but for an
explication of the view relies primarily on Talbott. Wl'lereas NU relies on
miraculous intervention to bring about a transformation of the creature's
will, and hence can be challenged on the grounds that it violates the creature's autonomy, SUI holds that God guarantees the salvation of all creatures in a way that does not violate their autonomy: those who do not
autonomously will communion by the time of their deaths are allowed to
continue to exist in a less-than-ideal state until such a tin'le as they da
autonomously will communion with God. In the interval, God is not passive, but works diligently to, in effect, persuade the creature to freely choose
the beatific vision-by, as Murray puts it, "progressively making clear to
the person that making evil choices and having a vicious character is ultimately not in the person's true self interest."l1 We may suppose, in the
effort to reconcile this view with scriptural passages typically interpreted
to support DH, that God's persuasive efforts take the form of remedial
punishments whose effect is to remove all inhibitors to salvation. 12 In order
for SUI to be a genuinely universalist position, SUI must include the thesis
that all persons will ultimately choose the beatific vision under these conditions. Talbott thinks that this latter thesis is true because
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once all ignorance an.d deception and bondage to desire is removed,
so that a person is truly "free" to choose, there can no longer be any
motive for choosing eternal misery for oneself. 13
Murray offers two main criticisms of SUl. The first, which he refers to as
"the oddity of the earthly life," strikes me as rather uncompelling and will
therefore not be the main focus of my attention here. Briefly, Murray thinks
th.at if SUI is right and we have all eternity after the end of 01.lr earthly life to
choose God, then it becomes difficult to account for the earthly life. Given
that this life has such poor soteriological results, wouldn't it be better to simply place people immediately into the post-mortem state which, according to
SUl, has the best possible soteriological results (universal salvation)?14 This
objection strikes me as LIDcompelling for two reasons. First, given that this
earthly life does have such poor soteriological results, it would be exceedingly odd if a perfectly loving God who sought communion with all his creatures would rely on nothing but this earthly life for the conversion of
humankind. Hence, however problematic this earthly life may be for the universalist, the problems are magnified if we hold-as Murray and other advocates of DH do-that this life is all the chan.ce we gel. From a comparative
standpoint, then, the oddity of the earthly life provides little reason to prefer
DH to SUl. My second reason for finding this objection uncompelling is that
th.e oddity of the earthly life can be accounted for rather easily within the
framework of SUl. After all, it is often an awareness of our own mortality
that leads us to seek out God. The inevitability and neamess of death, coupled with its mystery an.d fearfulness, seem to have the power to in.spire
some people to seek meaning in that which is etemal. An earthly existence
characterized by transiency and mortality may therefore inspire many to
seek out the constancy of God far sooner than they would have had th.ey been
placed ab initio in the post-martern state with its unlimited time frame far
choosing. Hence, God may have placed us initially in this short earthly existence in order that many of us would avoid needless suffering by finding
communion with. Hirn far sooner than. we would have otherwise. However,
given the poor soterialogical results of this earthly existence (due largely to
its brevity), He would not rely on this life alone to convert the unregenerate.
Hence, Murray's first main objection to SUI is not very convincing. I-lis
second line of criticism has greater force. SUI assurnes that God is able to
save all withoLlt violating anyone's autonomy. This assumption, Murray
thinks, is false. On the contrary, Murray believes that the only way for God
to guarantee the salvation of all would be by violating human autonomy.
Hence, universalism is incompatible with a view of God in which God
always fully respects the autonomy of His creatures.
In order to evaluate this objection fully, we must first consider what
Murray means by "autonomy." Murray n1akes it clear that, by "aLltonomy," he means more than mere freedom of choice. For Murray, autonomy
involves "free choosing that is expressed in actions that infLuence the course of
events in the world."15 Hence, Murray says,
...a world with "autonomous" creatures is a world where creatures
are not only allowed to make evil choices, but choices whicl1 issue in

226

Faith and Philosophy

evil acts and have evil consequences. A world in which agents can
choose freely but are unable to act autonomously would be a world
filled with freely choosing brains-in-vats. 16
Murray goes on to note that one of the consequences that our actions can
have (at least in the real world) is on our states of character: our virtues and
our vices. What we do can strengthen or weaken our habituated dispositions. I7 This observation figures prominently in his later discussion, but one
comment about it is warranted up front. While our actions do have consequences for our states of character in the real world, such a causal COlli'lection
between action al'ld cl'laracter is not aprerequisite for autonomy. It is quite
possible to have a world where my choices express themselves in actions
that have consequences for good or ill-and hence a world in which autonomy exists-without an habituating effect being among those consequences.
In fact, my habits seem to put restrictions on my freedom to choose, insofar as it becomes increasingly difficult to choose against my habits the more
firmly entrenched these habits become. While autonomy requires more than
freedom of choice, it does require freedom of choice as weIl. As such, it
would seem that a world in which my choices generate habits of this sort is a
world where autonomy exists in tension with itself: one of the consequences
of free choice (one that helps to make it autonomous in the full sense)
involves a restriction of my free choice. I8 While there may be reasons why a
good God would create human nature with this habit-forming feature, the
maximization of autonomy is therefore not one of them. Autonomy can exist
without such a feature, and may even be restricted by it.
One last point about autonomy: while Murray rightly notes that autonomy requires not only freedom of choice but free choices that have meaningful consequences, he leaves out a third feature of autonomy. In particular, he leaves out the traditional view (one whose roots extend at least back
to Aristotle, and which finds it fullest expression in Kant), that choices
made in ignorance of relevant facts are not fully autonomous. If I choose
course A over course B based on false beliefs about A and B, I am not really
cl'loosing A over B. Rather, I am choosing my mistaken idea of A over my
mistaken idea of B. Hence, it is inappropriate to say that I have
autonomously chosen A precisely because it is not really A that I have chosen. In evaluating the merits of universalism and DH with respect to their
implications for autonomy, it is important to keep all of these features of
autonomy in mind.

111: 1nfaZZibly but Freely Choosing God
Murray's most important criticisms of SUI are directed towards one of its
most central tenets. In particular, Murray wants to reject the following
principle:
(GP) Given unlimited opportunity to work on the unregenerate after
their deaths, it is in God's power to save every person without thereby

violating the person's autonomy.
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(GP) might be viewed as a conclusion implied by the following premises:
(PI) If a person is freed from all ignorance, deception, and bondage to
desire (hereafter "salvation inhibitors"), the person will infallibly but
autonomously choose eternal communion with God.
(P2) Given unlimited opportunity to work on the unregenerate after
their deaths, it is in God's power to free every person from salvation
inhibitors using nothing but autonomy-preserving methods.
In effect, Murray challenges (GP) by denying both (PI) and (P2). With
respect to (PI) Murray explicitly challenges the following claim, which I
will call (FI):
.. .if one is "fully informed" about one's good and furthermore, if one
is not causally determined to choose evil by one's own affective
states, then even a libertarian free agent will infallibly choose the
goOd. 19
(FI), together with the assumption that communion with God is the greatest possible human good, entails (PI).
Before looking at Murray's objection to (FI), I should consider a problem
that Murray does not explicitly raise, but that may lurk in the background
of Murray's thinking. (FI) holds that it is possible to freely (in a libertarian
sense) yet infallibly choose the good. But if the good is truly chosen infallibly by someone with full information and no contrary affective states, that
means that the good is chosen in all those possible worlds where these conditions hold. In other words, if my choice of the good is to be infallible
under the given conditions, it must be that the given conditions are sufficient conditions for my choosing the good. But then it seems that the given
conditions determine my choice. How, then, can n1y choice be free in a libertarian sense?
First of all, it should be noted that, within the context of SUI, the unredeemed are afforded unlimited time to freely choose God. Hence, the defender of SUI need not hold that in every possible world, a person freed from all
salvation inhibitors will autonomously choose God at any time T. Rather,
the defender of SUI needs only to hold that in every possible world, given
an unlimited amount of time, a person freed from all salvation inhibitors will
autonomously choose God at some time T. Put another way, the universalist
view is that no autonomous agent, freed from all contrary desires, will for all
eternity choose contrary to what they know to be the supreme good. Even if,
by virtue of her libertarian freedom, she is able to choose at any time T that
which she has absolutely no motive whatever to choose, she will eventually
choose that which she has every reason to choose and absolutely no motive
to reject, if she is given infinite opportunities to choose.
Put another way, we might say that what is necessary to preserve libertarian freedom is that, at any time T, there is at least one possible world in
which the agent chooses contrary to what she has every motive to choose
at T. But this is compatible with there being no possible world which is
such that the agent chooses contrary to what she knows is best at every time
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T. Hence, given infinite time to choose, it seems that there is no contradiction in saying that libertarian free agents freed from all ignorance an.d
bondage to desire will infallibly choose the good (whether it would be true
to say this is another matter).
At this point, a critic might point out that what is true of choosing the
good in general might not be true of choosing the ultimate good of communion with God. This choice is unique in that, at least as traditionally understood, the choice once made confirms the agent in that choice for the rest of
eternity. Hence, in order for an agent to remain free to choose rejection of
God at any time T, there must be a possible world in which the agent has
rejected God up to and including time T. But this will have to be true of every
T indefinitely into the future. Hence, the objection concludes, in order for
an agent to remain free to reject God at any time T, there must be at least
one possible world in which the agent rejects God at every time T.
Notice, however, that tl"le supposition of SV1 is that we are dealing with
an infinite timeline. The critic may be right that in order to preserve libertarian freedom, for any actual time along this infinite timeline there must be
at least one possible world (a "God-rejecting world") in which the agent
continues to reject God up to and including that time. But someone who
holds that the creature will infallibly but freely choose God given infinite
time needn't reject this point. For it is possible to hold that, as the time line
moves towards infinity, the percentage of God-rejecting worlds approaches 0,
and that God will simply permit the timeline to continue indefinitely until
the creature in fact chooses God-an outcome that is guaranteed given the
fact that the time frame is infinite and the percentage of God-rejecting
worlds approaches 0 as time moves towards infinity.
To Lmderstand this point, it is important to recognize that even if there
are an infinite number of God-rejecting worlds at any time T, there are
degrees of infinity such that the totality of God-rejecting worlds will represent only a percentage of the totality of possible worlds. By analogy, consider
that although there are an infinite number of points in a one-inch line, those
points only represent fifty percent of the totality of points in a two-inch.line.
If we assurne that those who choose God are forever confirmed in their
choice, and that at any time T, for any creature who has not yet chosen God,
there is at least one possible world in which the creature chooses God for the
first time, it follows that the percentage of God-rejecting worlds will decrease
as time moves towards infinity. This is so because, given our assumption
that those wh.o choose God are forever confirmed in their choice, there is no
possible world such that, for any time T, it is a God-choosing world prior to
T but a God-rejecting world after T. However, given our assumption that at
any time T there is at least one possible world in which the creature chooses
God for the first time, it follows that at any time T there is at least one possible world such that it is a God-rejecting world prior to T but a God-choosing
world after T. Thus, for any times T an.d T-1, the nUlTLber of possible worlds
in which the agent continues to reject God is at least one less at T than it was
at T-1, and the number of God-choosing worlds is at least one more. This is
so because there is at least one possible world that was a God-rejecting world
at T-1 that ceases to be a God-rejecting world and becomes a God-choosing
world at T, bLlt no possible world in which the reverse is the case.
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Hence, as time moves towards infinity, the percentage of God-rejecting
worlds is going to decrease, even if the number of God-rejecting worlds
remains infinite. Thus, it is possible to maintain that, even if there is no particular moment in time where the number of God-rejecting worlds is 0, the
percentage of such worlds approaches 0 as the tin1e line moves towards infinity. And this may be precisely what we mean when we say that, given an
infinite time frame in which to choose, a libertarian free agent will infallibly
choose communion with God: the percentage of worlds in which the agent
continues to reject God approaches 0 as the time line moves towards infinity. Understood in these terms, there is nothing contradictory in claimiI1g
that a libertarian free agent cannot eternally reject God.
Gf course, that there is no contradiction in saying this does not mean
that it is true. What reason do we have to believe that it truly is impossible
for a libertarian free agent to eternally reject the good once freed from all
ignorance and bondage to desire? Put in the terms laid out above, what
reason do we have to think that the percentage of God-rejecting worlds
approaches 0 as the timeline moves towards infinity? We might hold, with
Aquinas, that the will is naturally ordered towards the good,2° and that this
natural ordering manifests itself at all times in a second-order desire for
what we know is best: we want to desire the best, even under those circumstances w11en we don't iI1 fact. If this is the case, then any time I choose
contrary to what I know is best I am choosing against the very nature of
my will. If contrary desires, proceeding from astate of character formed in
the absence of full information, were exerting an external influence on my
will, then we might expect this unnatural choice to be made with some
consistency. In the absence of such contrary impulses, however, the will
remains under the influence of its own nature. In almost every possible
world, we would expect the will to follow its own nature immediately. But,
assuming libertarian freedom, there is some possible world in which it
does not. Even so, it is reasonable to suppose that the percentage of possible worlds in which the will continues to resist its own nature, with neither
reason not motive, approaches 0 as the timeline moves towards infinity.
Eternal resistal1ce is in this sense impossible, even if resistance is possible
for any finite time frame. And l.lnderstood in these terms, the impossibility
of such eternal resistance seems not only coherent, but highly plausible.
That our wills do possess such a natural ordering towards the good also
seems highly plausible, given the assumption that we were made by a perfectly good God for the end of enjoying etemal communion with Hirn. To
think that God made us for this end, yet gave us wills that were utterly indifferent to the good, even God's perfect goodness, verges on a contradiction.
Someone might argue, of course, that such a natural ordering of the will
towards the good is incompatible with libertarian freedom. To this it might
be noted that such a natural ordering, because it is an intrinsic feature of
the human will itself, is not an efficient cause external to the will. Hence,
any time one acts on this natural desire for the good, one's will is solely
responsible for the act. If we add the further stipulation that it is possible
for the will to act contrary to this desire (even if that possibility is remote),
there remains a sense in which such a will has libertarian freedom (unless
by "libertarian freedom" we mean a freedom in which the will has no
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intrinsic responsiveness to reason, and no propensity to respond to
motives outside itself-but freedom in this sense is clearly something that
no actual person possesses, nor would it be a boon if SOll1eone did).
With these ideas in mind, let us turn to Murray's criticism of (FI).
Murray distinguishes between two senses of "fully informed": first, it can
mean knowing all the relevant facts and having no relevant false beliefs;
second, it can mean knowing all the relevant facts and "ascrib(ing) the
proper weight to the things known" by structuring one's desires "so that
they properly reflect the importance of what is known."21 Hence, there are
two versions of (FI), what I will caH (FII) and (FI2), corresponding to the
two senses of "fuHy informed." Essentially, Murray argues that both (FII)
and (FI2) are false. (FII) is false, he says, because a libertarian free agent can
exhibit weakness of will, and can choose to act against what she fuHy
knows is best out of adesire that does not reflect this knowledge (for exampIe, choosing smoking, unhealthy diets, or promiscuous sex even though
we know they are bad for US).22 He thinks (FI2) is false because a person
can be fully informed in the second sense only if her libertarian freedom is
underll1ined. This is because, according to Murray, in order to guarantee
that people are fully informed in the second sense it is necessary not only
that people know that communion with God is best, but that tl'ley "structure their desires accordingly." But the only way to insure that they structure their desires accordingly is for God to ll1iraculously transform their
desires to harmonize with what they know is best. 23 Murray takes such
transformation of desires to be a violation of autonomy, although he does
not explain why. In any event, he concludes that full information in the
first sense does l'lOt guaral'ltee COll1munion with God, while full information in the second sense does so only at the expense of autonomy.
It seems to me, however, that Murray has failed to make a compelling
case for the falsity of FII. Murray contends that fuB information in the first
sense does not guarantee communion with God because people may act on
desires contrary to what they know is best (what he calls "weakness of
will"). But this answer assurnes the presence of such contrary desires. We
can't act on unhealthy desires if we do not have any. But why would we
desire what goes against our understanding of what is best? The most
obvious answer is that we have developed bad habits prior to receiving the
relevant understanding-in other words, because we are under the influence of desires that were formed in the absence of full information, and
now that we do have fuH information we can't shake off the bad habit.
However, FII assurnes that the agent has been freed from all such
unhealthy affective states. One of Talbott's key theses is that such "stripping away" of unhealthy desires is not a violation of our autonomy, since
those desires were l'lOt freely chosen with full information, and they
presently interfere with free choice. 24
If we truly have been freed from bad habits that might generate desires
contrary to the good, what possible source could there be for such unhealthy
desires? Is there any reason to think that a person who sees with perfect and
immediate clarity the intrinsic preferability of object A over object B would
freely choose to desire B more highly than A (given that there is at the time no
extant subjective preference)? Of course, if B is a more immediate good tl'lan
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A, someone with ahabit of preferring immediate gratification over long term
well-being might come to desire B over A even in the full knowledge that A
is preferable. But in that case the person's capacity to choose is again being
restricted by a bad habit-in this case, the bad habit of preferring immediate
rewards above overall well-being. This habit may develop because the more
immediate good seems like the greater good to many people, especially in
their formative years. But according to FII, any such habit formed on the
basis of erroneous information will be eliminated, and in the presence of full
information the more immediate good will no longer seem preferable. The
same can be said for any other n10tives associated with weakness of will,
such as the habit of choosing the more intensely pleasurable experience, or of
choosing out of stubbomness or contrariness. All such choices proceed from
states of character properly classified as vices-and these, by our assumption, have been eliminated by God. Of course, sometimes weakness of will
manifests itself in our tendency to choose our own good over the more altruistic demands of morality. But weakness of will of this sort does not come into
play in the present case, since what is at issue is choosing communion with
God, which by hypothesis is our own greatest good.
In short, if we have been freed of all those habituated desires which
were formed in the absence of full information, then given full inforn1ation-even in only the first sense-we have every reason to "structure
(our) desires so that they properly reflect the importance of what is
known." There is no reason for us to do otherwise--especially given tl1e
assumption that our will is naturally ordered to the good, and that we
therefore natLlrally possess a second-order desire for what we know is best.
Of course, Murray could still hold that it is possible (however unlikely)
for a libertarian free agent to choose against reason and native desire in
such a case. But, as argued above, even if a libertarian free agent who is
freed from all ignorance and bondage to contrary desires can choose

against the good at any given time T, it 11ardly seems likely, givel1 the natural ordering of the will towards the good, that the agent could do so for all
eternity (especially an eternity in which God is diligently working to persuade the agent to choose the good). Given an infinite time frame, the
agent will inevitably choose the good. Of course, if I choose contrary to the
natural ordering of my will enough times (however unlikely it is that I do
so), I might manage to form a bad habit that could impel me to continue
choosing against the good. But then I would re-acquire a kind of bondage
to contrary desire of the sort tl1at, according to our assumption, God would
strip away. The possibility of God continually stripping away such states
of character without violating autonomy will be discussed below.
What this means is that full information in the first sense, combined
with the elimination of autonomy-inhibiting desires (that is, desires external to the natural ordering of our will), leads ultimately to full information
in the second sense. And this means that Murray's criticism of FI2 is also in
error. It is not necessary that God miraculously implant desires into people
in order to guarantee that their desires harmonize with the good. All that is
necessary is that He give them full understanding of what is in fact good,
and free them of the autonomy-inhibiting habits of desire that keep them
from acting on their natural second-order desire for the goOd. 25
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IV: //A Different Denial of /Autonomy'!!

Murray's other n1ain criticism of SVI amounts to a denial of (P2). He wishes to deny that, given unlin1ited opportunity to work on the unregenerate
after their deaths, it is in God's power to free every person of salvation
inhibitors using nothing but autonomy-preserving methods. Murray thinks, on
the contrary, that continuing to offer the opportunity for salvation to those
who have rejected it by the end of their lives amounts to a violatiol1 of tl1eir
autonomy, because the choice of the unregenerate to reject God is not
being accepted. They aren't permitted to have what they have chosen,
namely alienation from God.
He argues for this point in terms of an analogy, which he refines in the
light of objections. The final version of the analogy involves a fast-food
drive-tl1rough which, apparently, includes both healthy and rotten hamburgers on the menu (I can only assurne it is White Castle). Those who
order rotten burgers (presumably supposed to represent those who choose
alienation from God) receive what they ordered and get sick. We can
expect that this ill experience might lead the rotten burger eaters to reconsider their choice, but Murray asks us to imagine someone who has cultivated a taste for rotten burgers througl1 repeatedly choosing them. They
continue to choose rotten burgers every time they get into line, out of a
fixed state of character. Murray tells us that SVI involves, in effect, repeatedly forcing these rotten-burger-eaters to order again and again until they
start choosing healthy burgers (communion with God) and their former
state of character begins to break down. In this sense their preference for
rotten burgers isn't being respected. They aren't permitted to be rotten
burger lovers, because they are required to keep returning to the queue
until they start choosing healthy burgers and their habits start to change.l6
Murray is clearly working with a confusing (and confused) analogy
here. The choice between the healthy burger and the rotten burger can be
understood in two ways. On the one hand, we could have in mind the
choice, at any time T, between communion with God and alienation from
God. On the other hand, he could have in mind the choice between eternal
communion with God and eternal alienation from God. It seems, in fact,
that Murray fails to adequately distinguish between these two alternatives.
Suppose that Murray takes the "healtl1y burger" to represent eternal
communion with God, and the "rotten burger" to represent eternal alienation. On this view, if at some time, say Tl, a person chooses eternal alienation, God refuses to accept that choice and "sends the person back in line"
to cl100se again. If at time T2 the choice is still etemal alienation, once again
the choice is rejected. This continues until at some time, Tn, the person
chooses eternal communion, at which point the choice is accepted, and the
person jOll1S God in blissful communion for the rest of eternity.
If this is what the advocate of SVI is committed to, then SVI does
involve autonomy violation of a sort. Even though the person who ultimately chooses eternal comm1.1nion with God does so of her own will, it is
only because the alternative choice has been consistently denied her each
time she tried to choose it in the past. She has no real freedom to choose
eternal alienation, if that is what she wants.
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But notice that this way of setting up the choice is itself an "autonomy
minimizing" strategy. According to this approach, at time Tl I am to
choose between communion with God at all times and alienation from God
at all times. This means that the choice is set up at Tl so that, if my choice is
accepted at Tl, I am deprived of all future choice on the matter at all future
times. Only if my choice is rejected at Tl (and my autonomy is therefore
directly violated) do I still have a choice on the matter at T2. Hence, if the
choice is set up in this way, there is an inevitable restriction of autonomy
whether my choice is accepted or not.
In other words, if the choice is conceived in this way, the advocate of
limited salvation is little better than the universalist when it comes to
autol'lOmy violations. In effect, God is saying at Tl, "Choose now and forever." Even if God respects my choice at Tl, the way in which the choice is
set up places restrictions on my autonomy, by denying me the possibility
of ever changing my mind. But it is precisely this "choose now and forever" approach to salvation that the advocate of SUI wants to deny. The
advocate of SUI holds that there is no time at which one can no longer
change one's mind. 27
It follows that SUI is more adequately represented if the choice, at any
time T, is between communion with God at T and alienation from God at
T. If the choice is understood in these terms, then the person gets exactly
what they choose at any time T. At no point is their choice rejected. Under
this understal'lding, SUI holds that people always get exactly what they
choose with respect to their relationship with God at any time T. The reason why all are ultimately saved is because all eventually come to realize
that communion with God is preferable to alienation, and all are eventually stripped of affective states that inhibit their capacity to choose what is
preferable. Given sufficient time, SUI l'lolds tl'lat, in effect, everyone will
eventually "catch on" and begin consistently choosing healthy burgers
over rotten ones.
Murray can respond here by saying that, even if people "get what they
order" at any time T, their choice for the "rotten burger" isn't respected,
because they are "forced" to get back in line al'ld order again. In fact, this is
ultimately Murray's reason for holding that SUI fails to respect autonomy.28 But this answer only reveals a limitation of the analogy. The reason
why all are forced to choose again and again at all times is simply because
God offers communion with Hirnself as a kind of "standing offer" which is
never withdrawn. Since the offer is never withdrawn, a person faces the
choice of accepting or rejecting the offer at any time T, and is in this sense
"forced" to choose.
A better al'lalogy than Murray's, which captures this idea of a "standing
offer," would be to imagine that I offer everyone in town the opportunity
to come live in my horne for as long as they desire. If this offer is never
withdrawn, then you are "forced" to choose at any time T whether to
accept or reject it. To strengthen the analogy, we can imagine (contrary to
fact and the realities of a philosopher's salary) that my horne is such a wonderful place to live that it is intrinsically preferable to any other dwelling in
town (and, of course, it is so spacious that it can accommodate the town's
whole population with ease). Anyone who takes me up on my offer, and
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moves in, will find it so rewarding that she will choose to stay forever.
Anyone who consistently rejects my offer will do so either because she fails
to fully appreciate what a great offer it is, or because she is trapped by bad
habits that inhibit her capacity to freely choose. SUI holds that God is able,
in time, to strip away both kinds of impediments.
The fact that it is in the nature of standin.g offers that we are"forced" at
all times either to accept or reject them in no way thwarts the autonomy of
those towards whom such offers are directed. On the contrary, "limitedtime offers" pose a greater threat to auton.omy, as can be attested by anyone who has faced high-pressure sales tactics. When a choice must be
made now or (as Murray seems to hold) by the moment oJ death, one's choices are restricted in a way that they are not if one is free to choose at any
time. Hence, contrary to Murray's claim, the limited salvation of DH places
greater restrictions on autonomy than does SUl.
There is, however, a crucial dimension to Murray's analysis which. is not
addressed in the above arguments. In particular, Murray considers in his
discussion the character of the person making the choice. What is denied me
under SUl, according to Murray, is the autonomy to choose to be aperSOll.
with a certain sort of character-namely, a person with a God-rejecting character. 29 After all, a person with a God-rejecting character has a fixed disposition to reject God, and will therefore continue to do so ad infinitum unless
stripped of this disposition. 30 Even given a standing offer to choose God, and
unlimited time to take God up on that offer, a person with a God-rejecting
character, who is habituated to reject God, will remain forever in astate of
alienation unless subjected to pressures (such as remedial punishments) that
strip away the God-rejecting character. Universalism is guaranteed under
SUl, then, only if God is prepared to strip away such a fixed disposition to
reject God, allowing the person to "start from scratch" and develop their
character anew-and to keep doing so until the person develops a Godchoosing character and thereby enters into communion with GOd. 31
Talbott believes that such a stripping procedure would liberate us from
bondage to desire, and thereby increase our autonomy. Murray believes,
on the contrary, that this process of stripping away the fixed dispositions
formed through habituation is a violation of autonomy. In asense, it
deprives us of tll.e freedom to become the kind of person we choose to be:
under SUl, we are simply not free to become God-rejecting people. I
should note that Murray's point here, in order to be plausible, needs to be
modified slightly. Under SUI we are free to become God-rejecting people.
If we choose consistently to reject God, we will develop states of character
that habituate us to such rejection. What is not possible for us to do is to
hold onto such astate of character Jor all eternity. God will eventually strip
away such astate of character, if not in this life then in some post-mortem
state. It should also be noted that this "stripping-away" process need not
be understood as a miraculous transformation, wherein God, so to speak,
waves his magic wand and the relevant affective states are removed. One
nl.ight imagine that God subjects the unregenerate to remedial punishments (the "hell" referred to in scriptures) which are, given sufficient time,
always successful in inspiring the unregenerate to shake off their bad
habits. 32 Even so, it remains the case that, under SUl, God does not permit
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anyone to cling to a God-rejecting character for all eternity. And this is
what, for Murray, constitutes a violation of autonomy.
To strengthen his case for this view, Murray asks us to consider a hypothetical person who, if allowed to go through the process of forming a
fixed character and being stripped of it ten times, would develop a Godembracing character on only the sixth and ninth occasions. If we assurne
SUl, then, as Murray rightly points out, the process of stripping away
character dispositions would be stopped on the sixth occasion, and the person would thereafter enjoy eternal communion with God. But Murray
asserts that stopping the process at this point would be "arbitrary."33 His
main reason for thinking so seems to be that if a person would develop a
God-rejecting character 80% of the time, then it makes more sense to stop
the process on a God-rejecting cycle (ar not stop the process at all).
Clearly, however, stopping the process on a God-embracing cycle is not
at all arbitrary. After all, it is only if one stops the process on a Godembracing cycle that the person will get to enjoy the beatific vision. One
might very weIl argue that a perfectly loving God would choose to end the
process at a point which would be most beneficial to the person-namely,
on a God-embracing cycle. Thus, there is good reason to end the process at
such a point, and God's decision to do so is not arbitrary at alle
But given the context within which Murray makes his remarks, we
might take it that his real objection to ending th.e process at a God-embracing cycle is not that doing so is arbitrary, but rather that doing so fails to
respect the creature's aLltonomy. Perhaps Murray thinks that since the
creature would choose a God-rejecting character 80% of the time, the creature is "voting" in favor of a God-rejecting character by the frequency with
which she chooses it, and that by ending the process on a God-embracing
cycle, God is failing to respect this "vote."
Murray considers one possible response to this argument, which he
finds inadequate. In fact, this response is far more decisive that Murray
takes it to be. Additionally, there is at least one other compelling response
which an advocate of SUI can offer. Taken together, these responses decisively undermine Murray's argument based on character-choice.
The response which Murray considers explicitly is the view that once
one has cultivated a God-embracing character, one would continue to do
so in future cycles. Murray can see no reason why we should think so,
however, since "the dispositions constitLltive of one's character are, on this
picture, completely purged after each cycle." What Murray neglects is that
this "pLlrging" is a stripping away only of the habituated dispositions, not of
dispositions intrinsic to human nature (such as the natural ordering of the
will towards the good), nor of the knowledge of what it was like to be confirmed in a given character-state. Given the hypothesis that the chief
human good is communion with God, there is no surer way to becon1e
acquainted with this good than to experience it by developing a Goden1bracing character. If God should strip away the habit of choosing God
from someone who had developed such a character, there is every reason
to think that in the absence of any habituated disposition, but with a natural
disposition of the will towards the good and full knowledge that embracing God is the greatest good, the person would imn1ediately choose to
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embrace God and quickly develop a God-embracing character anew.
Thus, it seems that there is excellent reason to think that, once one
chooses to cultivate a God-embracing character, one would continue to do
so in future cycles. Hence, this objection to Murray's argument based on
character-choice is far stronger than MLlrray takes it to be.
A second problem with Murray's argull1ent based on character-choice is
his assumption that we choose our states of character (and therefore we are
being denied the fruits of our choices if God strips us of the dispositions
which flow from our character).34 In some cases this may be true. For exampIe, I may decide that I want to become a more patient person, because I
respect patience as a virtue. I decide to cultivate a character of patience
through, as Aristotle puts it, "like activities." On the other hand, SOll1etimes
(as is usually the case with bad habits) my state of character creeps up on
me without ever being chosen for itself. Consider my habit of wasting hours
playing solitaire on my computer. I did not ever choose to be a solitaire
addict. Rather, I chose to play solitaire on numerous successive occasions,
and a character disposition to play solitaire emerged as a result. While the
bad habit is a consequence of my choices, the habit is not what I chose.
Thus, there are both chosen and unchosen states of character. With
respect to the former, I presumably choose to cultivate a given state of
character because I believe that it is the best character to have. Now this
belief that ll1Y state of character is the best to have can either be true or
false. If false, I am making my choice in ignorance of the truth, and my
choice is not truly autonomous. Stripping away a given character state is a
violation of autonomy only if the character state is one I autonomously
chose. Hence, stripping away unchosen states of character would not be a
violation of autonomy, nor would stripping away chosen states of character that were chosen on the basis of ignorance of the truth. In either of these
cases, the stripping away process would free the person from the compelling power of habituated desires that the person would choose not to
have if able to ll1ake a choice in full knowledge of the relevant facts. As
such, this stripping-away process would actuallY contribute to autonomy,
as Talbott maintains.
PLlt more simply, given the assumption that communion with God is
our highest good, it is hard to imagine that anyol1e would autonomously
choose to develop a God-rejecting character. If someone did develop such
a character, it would either be an unchosen consequence of repeated bad
choices, or it would be chosen on the basis of misinformation. In either
case, no denial of autonomy results from stripping away a God-rejecting
character. However, when someone develops a God-embracing character,
stripping away such astate of character would be autonomy-violating.
Consider: either a God-embracing character is directly chosen, in the sense
of being consciously cultivated on the basis of the judgment that having
such astate of character would be for the best, or it ell1erges as a result of
successively choosing, not the character-state as such, but the activity of
embracing God. If it is directly chosen, then it is chosen on the basis of the
belief that embracing God is best-in other words, according to our
hypothesis, on the basis of accurate information. To strip away astate of
character that was chosel1 on the basis of accurate information is aLltonomy
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violating. If the state of character was not directly chosen, but emerged as a
result of successively choosing to embrace God, it nevertheless seems the
case that any person who had developed such astate of character would
endorse it, or choose it after the fact, once given full information. After all,
such astate of character would inspire them to continually choose their
chief good. To strip away astate of character that is endorsed on the basis
of accurate information would also seem to be autonomy-violating. Thus,
when Murray claims that ending the "process of character-making and purging" on a God-embracing cycle is arbitrary, and hence autonomy-violating, he is in error. On the contrary, ending the process on a God-ell1bracing cycle is required out of respect for autonomy. As such, DH does less to
maximize creaturely autol10my than does SUl.
One final point is worth making. Even if we ignore the responses above
and accept that SUI is autonomy violating, by Murray's reasoning SUI
violates only what migl1t be called "second-order" autonoll1Y, while preserving first-order autonomy. To see what I mean, let us return to Murray's
hypothetical case of the person who is PLlt through a "process of charactermaking and -purging," and who would, if allowed to go through the
process ten times, embrace God only on cycles six and nine. But God stops
the process the very first time the person aLltonomously chooses communion with God. Hel1ce, the person enjoys, at the end of the sixtl1 cycle, an
eternal communion with God that has been autonomously chosen. The
autonoll1y at work in cycle six, when the person is saved, is what I will call
the person's first-order autonomy. Murray does not deny that a Godembracing character was autonomously chosen in cycle six. What he holds
is that there rell1ains an autonomy violation of a different sort-presLlmably because God (rather than the person) decided when to stop the
process of character-making and -purging, and because this decision, while
in harmony with the person's first-order autonomy at the time it is made,
ignores the person's overall pattern of choices. No matter what the person's
overall pattern of choices, the final outcome will be the same: eternal communion with God. One's pattern of choice makes no difference to one's
final destiny. It should be noted, however, that one's autonomous choice
still does ll1ake a difference insofar as the choice to embrace God is required
for salvation, and insofar as the choice to reject God is respected---even if
the habits of character which result from repeatedly making such a choice
are stripped away. And even though the final outcome is the same no matter what one's pattern of choices might be, those who persist in rejecting
God put off enjoying COll1munion with God longer thal1 those who choose
God in earlier cycles (and hence remain in "hell" for a longer period of
time). So Murray cannot maintain that the fact that the final result is the
same no matter what the choice patten1 means that there is no autonomy in
his sense. Because our choices do have significant consequences even if, in
the end, all of us are saved.
Presumably, however, Murray thinks that SUI involves giving to some
persons a final destiny that, even though chosen by them, is out of harmony with their overall pattern of choices. This is what I am calling a violation
of second-order autonomy. But surely the violation of such second orderautonomy is not problematic in the way that the violation of first-order
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autonomy is problematic. Why should one think so? I certainly an1 not
likely to complain about receiving some good that I have freely chosen on
the grounds that it doesn't correspond to some overall choice-pattern of
which I cannot be fully aware myself (since it is the counterfactual pattern
that would result were God to act differently). FlIrthermore, my choice-patterns, while they result from my choices, are not then1selves chosen as such.
Finally, choice-patterns are not intentionally directed towards specific ends
the way that choices are; hence, to say that some good is out of harmony
with a choice pattern is harder to make sense of than to say that a good is
out of harmony with my choices.
In short, given the dubious value (even coherence) of respecting secondorder autonomy, it becomes difficult to see why respect for such autonomy
should take precedence over ensuring the creature's eternal happiness.
While there may be some reason to allow the creature to forego eternal
happiness out of respect for first-order autonomy, there is no similar case
to be made for second-order autonomy.35 To the extent that SVI guarantees
eternal happiness for all creatures without any violation of first orderautonomy, it would seem contrary to God's perfect love to deny eternal
happiness to son1e creatures because some counterfactual choice pattern
could be interpreted as a vote for damnation.
A committed advocate of DH might, in the light of all these arguments,
finally choose to reject my view that the percentage of possible worlds in
which an autonomous agent, freed of all salvation inhibitors, rejects God
approaches 0 as tl1e timeline moves towards infinity. Despite what strikes
me as the strong plausibility of this view, I cannot decisively reject the view
that the percentage of such God-rejecting worlds approaches some number
greater than 0 as the timeline approaches infinity. But even if this should
prove to be the case, the percentage would surely be very low. For in every
possible world that God could create, God would be diligently working
with all of His formidable power and wisdom to ensure that those of His
creatures who were made for communion with Hirn would realize that
end. Even if we suppose that among the possible worlds in which God
labors in this way there is some fraction in which not all are saved, it seems
to me that we would seriously underestimate God's resourcefulness if we
held that this fraction were anything but very small. That one of these
remotely possible worlds should turn out to be the actual world strikes me
as so unlikely as to warrant little serious consideration. In the words of one
priest, "Of course I believe in hell. But only a fool would think th.ere was
anybody in there."
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